Author: Herbut Józef Title: DIRECTIONS AND PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION (Filozofia religii: jej problematyka i jej odmiany) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.15, number: 2011/4, pages: 911-917 Keywords: PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION, DEFINITION OF RELIGION, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The main task of the philosophy of religion is to adequately define the concept of religion – it (...) should be comprehensive enough to cover all historically known forms of religion and restrictive enough to exclude any other cultural forms which are only similar to religion. How we understand the nature of religious beliefs (their propositional, volitional and emotional content) determines the method of philosophizing about religion. The religious doctrine plays a decisive role in religion, in one way or another motivating and justifying moral norms and worship practices. Traditionally oriented philosophers of religion have been chiefly interested in reasons for accepting a religious doctrine and in metaphysical problems; analytical philosophy of religion has brought into focus the semiotics of religious propositions. (shrink)

Fr. Józef Kożuchowski Rationality and Faith in God: the Robert Spaemann’s ApproachThis article traces three threads of philosophical thinking of one of the most illustrious German thinkers today which relate to the issue of rationality of faith in God. The first question addresses the conviction that faith itself appears to be a rational act, which is why it is no accident that science has never deployed any major agreement against it. Therefore, the alternative of science or faith is ruled (...) out, since accepting it would be tantamount to abandoning the complementary understanding of reality. Thus faith not only is not contradictory in itself nor irrational; instead, it even enhances, complements, and enriches the cognition, allows to perceive the facets of reality not encompassed by scientific methods (its final cause, what it is in essence, purpose of existence, accidentality), dispels the illusions of the so-called scientific outlook, or scientism, reveals our dignity, and contributes to its growth. The significance of Spaemann’s thought is also apparent in the context of two influential approaches in our culture which, as “superstitions of modernity” (Wittgenstein), cannot be accepted: the enlightenment approach, which considered revealed faith doubtful, and the scientistic one, which assigns cognitive value only to natural sciences. The second question pertains to the relationship of faith in God with our reason and its cognitive abilities. Spaemann illustrates it on the example of Nietzsche’s approach, according to which there is an inseparable link between the two. One is not possible without the other. The third aspect of the analysed issue takes the form of Spaemann’s original argumentation, emphasising the rationality of our faith in God, in which the German thinker relates to grammar, while the argumentation itself is a postulate of theoretical reason. Keywords: faith, rationality, science, Robert Spaemann, Friedrich Nietzsche, futurum exactum. (shrink)

ROBERT SPAEMANN’S NEW APPROACH TO THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF THE PERSON The article is concerned with the subject of the person, which constitutes the core of anthropological reflections of the eminent German thinker, Robert Spaemann. The issue of the person was especially noticeable in one of his most important works entitled Personen. This issue generated a keen interest and recognition of specialists in many countries. These reflections are based on the metaphysical concept of human existence. That is why Spaemann’s theory (...) of the person is often defined as metaphysics of the person. First, in the introduction, the author points to the significance of the issue; second, he describes its most important threads: understanding the person, the person’s identity and traits such as rationality, freedom, intentionality, love, religiousness, transcendence, ability to forgive, to keep one’s promise and to speak. The next part of the article presents the issues of the person’s self-fulfilment, indestructibility, being the subject of law, having a special status, i.e. dignity. Readers also learn why the classical vision of the person (Boethius, Thomas Aquinas, Kant) is not outdated, whereas Locke’s theory (as well as its radicalised version propagated by its well-known supporters, Parfit, Hoerster, Singer) remains unacceptable as contradictory in itself. As has been emphasized, it involves some false anthropological assumptions, e.g. the issue of the so-called potential person and the difference between human life and person’s life. However, the latter theory is increasingly popular at present since it supports, among others, the justifiability of abortion and euthanasia, and it suits the contemporary mentality with a definitely hedonist overtone. Many of Spaemann’s views on the person are truly significant and innovative. The issue that Spaemann himself regards as particularly important is his response to the false ideas of Locke and his contemporary continuators. The eminent scholar not only reveals the logical incoherence of this thought and its deviation from common sense, but using unique linguistic and transcendental-pragmatic argumentation, he proves that human is a person, i.e. “someone”, since the moment of conception. Thus, we cannot be thought of as if we had been “something” at first. That is why, not accidentally, the subtitle of Spaemann’s most important book on anthropology, i.e. Personen, is The difference between “someone” and “something”. In this response to Locke’s false theory (and its supporters), he explains that one cannot talk about such a distinction in the case of human beings. The second innovative issue in Spaemann’s work is the defence of the classical concept of the person and expressing it in a new way. The third one is his attempt at overcoming both spiritualistic and naturalistic perception of the human being. The fourth is Spaeman’s observation that our ability to forgive and to keep promises should be treated as a significant trait of the person. The article presents also some aspects of Spaemann’s vision of the person which have not been the subject of analyses yet, neither in the Polish nor in the Western literature, e.g. characteristics of the person, the person being the subject of laws and the person’s special status (ontological and moral dignity). Keywords: ROBERT SPAEMANN, THEORY OF THE PERSON, ONTOLOGICAL DIGNITY, MORAL DIGNITY. (shrink)

In his Logic of Religion (1965) Bocheński presumed that: (1) ‘religion’ denotes a system of propositions of religious contents, (2) man becomes an advocate of a certain religion through an acceptance of its meta-dogma, i.e. a statement that the creed of this religion is true. In his article Religious Hypothesis Revised [in: P. Weingartner (ed.), Scientific and Religious Belief, Dordrecht 1994, 142-160] Bocheński writes that the concept of religion assumed in the Logic is wrong. Our experience shows that the conversion (...) of a man who previously was an unbeliever may occur in two steps: first, he accepts several elementary propositions about God. They constitute ‘basic faith’ (that God exists that He governs the events in the world, etc.). Then we have a collection of propositions that compose “the confession of faith” of a given religion. The religious hypothesis is applied, above all, when we accept a system. It is doubtful whether it can be used in the basic faith. In this paper, the author discusses first various forms of religious experience that inspires the basic faith: (1) a religious interpretation of secular phenomena; (2) an experience of sacrum in the world; (3) an ‘encounter’ of Transcendence. Then he presents a new version of this hypothesis: what kind of experience that some persons have accounts for religion and whether it permits to predict their new experiences or even new events. (shrink)

Belief is a mental state, its content being the statement of a certain state of affairs. With respect to the manner they arise, we divide beliefs into spontaneous and reflexive. When we take into consideration their bases, we speak about basic beliefs and beliefs derived from others. The terms “spontaneous belief” and “basic belief” have various meanings, but they are equivalent with regard to their range. Contemporary religious spontaneous and basic beliefs have various forms. In the Christian religion we speak, (...) among other things, about numinous beliefs, as described by R. Otto, and A. Plantinga’s properly basic beliefs. According to Otto, numinous experiences (of that which is tremendum et fascinans) are a source of firm beliefs for man, i.e. he has had contacts with some objective manifestations of divinity. Plantinga (whose thinking belongs to a more “naturalistic” strain) writes about properly basic beliefs, such that arise spontaneously in man (if he is not depraved by sinful life) who remains under respective circumstances. Such beliefs are the grounds for theistic derivative beliefs. The arguments for the truthfulness of the beliefs of the first and second type bring forth a series of questions, and they are constantly discussed by philosophers of religion. (shrink)

The idea of the moral good is considered a desirable and appreciated real existence. With reference to teachers it constitutes a personal pattern of judicious acting. Their special task is not only to teach necessary knowledge to students but also to instil moral conduct in them i.e. to form ‘a correct character’. This notion was present at the beginning of the 20th century and is also reflected in Archbishop Józef Bilczewski’s letter ‘The Character’ (1920). The ideas presented there remain (...) still valid also in the present historic moment of the nation. (shrink)

W swej pracy ks. Józef Bremer SJ zajmuje się problematyką relacji zachodzącej pomiędzy ciałem umysłem. Pytanie o ty relacji znane jest w literaturze - głównie angielsko-amerykańskiej - pod nazwą problem psychofizyczny. W dyskusji nt. tego problemu liczy się nazwisko amerykańskiego filozofa Wilfrida Sellarsa. Sellars reprezentuje materialistyczny lub, jak się ją czysto nazywa w fachowym języku filozoficznym, naturalistyczną czy fizykalną koncepcją umysłu.

Jozef Keulartz and Gilbert Leistra (eds): Legitimacy in European Nature Conservation Policy: Case Studies in Multilevel Governance Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s10806-010-9248-4 Authors Sarah Beach, Kansas State University Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work Manhattan KS USA Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863.

Tekst jest poświęcony pamięci Księdza Antoniego Siemianowskiego (1930-2022) — profesora filozofii, absolwenta Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego. Artykuł jest najszerszym dotąd opracowaniem życiorysu Księdza Profesora Siemianowskiego wraz z prześledzeniem jego poglądów filozoficznych — zbiera dotychczasowe publikacje dotyczące Księdza Profesora i dokonuje ich syntezy. Autor miał zamiar wskazać na najważniejsze momenty z życia duchownego-filozofa, który zapisał się w pamięci przestrzeni akademickich Kujaw i Wielkopolski — najbardziej w Inowrocławiu, z którego pochodził, a także Gniezna, z którym był związany poprzez pracę wykładowcy, przez ponad pół (...) wieku. Tekst analizuje drogę intelektualną Księdza Profesora od edukacji szkolnej, poprzez studia filozoficzno-teologiczne, studia doktoranckie, a w końcu poszukiwanie „własnej drogi w filozofii” — drogi od historii filozofii, poprzez tomizm do fenomenologii. Zwrócić należy uwagę, że Ksiądz Siemianowski nie zajmował się jedynie pracą naukową, ale był także jako prezbiter katolicki duszpasterzem, który także poprzez nauczanie pokoleń przyszłych kapłanów formował w nich styl myślenia, zgodnie z zasadą, że „filozofia jest służebnicą teologii”. Inną przestrzenią aktywności Księdza Siemianowskiego była publicystyka — nawiązawszy współpracę z wieloma czasopismami, popularyzował na ich łamach wiedzę z zakresu etyki, filozofii kultury czy antropologii filozoficznej. (shrink)

The existence of differences in time, meant to be structure ‹T,<›, where the earlier-later relation < is a linear ordering, dense and without the first and the last element, is a sine qua non condition of changes taking place at any temporal instant. Therefore it is impossible to give a definition of the operator of change ↑ (the intended meaning of the phrase „↑α” is „it is changing now what a states”) in the language Lͭ of Tense Logic calculi containing, (...) besides classical sentential connectives, temporal categories: G, H, F, P. The paper contains the proof of this statement. (shrink)

I argue that on Aristotle’s account practical thinking is thinking whose origin (archē) is a desire that has as its object the very thing that one reasons about how to promote. This feature distinguishes practical from productive reasoning since in the latter the desire that initiates it is not (unless incidentally) a desire for the object that one productively reasons about. The feature has several interesting consequences: (a) there is only a contingent relationship between the desire that one practically reasons (...) about how to satisfy and the action one decides on; (b) practical thinking and action cannot be separated from the agent, whereas productive thinking and production can be outsourced to someone else. The view has consequences also for the distinction between action and production. Finally, I illustrate the usefulness and correctness of my account of practical thinking by using it to shed new light on Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous agent must decide on her virtuous actions ‘for themselves’. (shrink)

The presented paper focuses on the analysis of strategic documents at the level of the European Union concerning the regulation of artificial intelligence as one of the so-called disruptive technologies. In the first part of the article, we outline the basic terminology. Subsequently, we focus on the summarizing and systemizing of the key documents adopted at the EU level in terms of artificial intelligence regulation. The focus of the paper is devoted to issues of personal data protection and cyber security (...) included in these strategic documents. The final part contains recommendations for future research and evaluation of its key features. (shrink)

Boża ukrytość jest problemem, który domaga się potraktowania z należytą powagą. Nie należy od tego problemu uciekać. Nie należy również ułatwiać sobie sprawy z Bożym ukryciem przez wprowadzanie rozwiązań, które sprawiają, że napięcie związane z problemem ukrytości znika lub zostaje złagodzone. Zaproponowane przeze mnie w książce Źródło i noc. Wprowadzenie do współczesnego absconditeizmu rozwiązanie, które nazwałem absconditeizmem, jest próbą zmierzenia się z problemem ukrytości w jego najmocniejszej możliwej postaci. Rozważam ten problem, biorąc pod uwagę również najmocniejszą wersję teizmu, którą określa (...) się jako klasyczny teizm. Artykuł stanowi łączną odpowiedź na teksty, których autorami są Maciej Bała, Ryszard Mordarski oraz Marek Słomka. Odnoszę się do pojawiających się w wyżej wymienionych tekstach krytyk, doprecyzowuję moje stanowisko oraz przedstawiam racje, dla których uważam, iż proponowany przeze mnie absconditeizm, stanowiący poważne i unikające ułatwień ujęcie problemu ukrytości, jest właściwym sposobem podejmowania tego zagadnienia. (shrink)

MARTIN HEIDEGGER’S FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY – REALITY ENCLOSED IN DASEIN Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology was supposed to divert philosophy towards the absolutely fundamental issue, which in the history of philosophy, unfortunately, as the author claimed, had been neglected. It was an attempt to designate the real foundation, which western metaphysics – while forgetting about being – had never touched. Thus, Heidegger focused on being. He asked about its sense, the way in which it can be described and explained. The answer was (...) to be found in the analysis of some special being – the human being. Only man, who exists in such a way (Heidegger uses the concept of Dasein) that by his very nature refers to being, is “open” to being. This article shows Heidegger’s explanation based on the analysis of man’s being, connecting the existence of reality with human existence, in its essence making the world thoroughly dependent on man, enclosing the world in Dasein. The world ceases to be the whole reality consisting of particular essences existing independently of man. It becomes “the condition”, the way of being. In the first part, the author presents how the fundamental ontology, while placing being at the centre of the discourse and using the phenomenological method, directs the attention to man. When asking about being, it asks about Dasein, about the way of man’s being. Then, the paper presents the existential analytics, the hermeneutics of Dasein, which is crucial from the point of view of Heidegger’s philosophy. The author explains what Heidegger’s existentials are and what it means that man exists as “being-in-the world”, that he exists in a way of “care”. Finally, it is shown that such an understanding of human being, the way in which he cares about the world and understands the world, i.e. designs it, results in enclosing the world in Dasein. The very sense of reality becomes thus the sense of human existence. Keywords: FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY, MARTIN HEIDEGGER, REALITY, DASEIN. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the widely held view that Aristotle's vicious agent is a principled follower of a wrong conception of the good whose soul, just like the soul of the virtuous agent, is marked by harmony between his reason and non-rational desires is an exegetical mistake. Rather, Aristotle holds – consistently and throughout the Nicomachean Ethics – that the vicious agent lacks any real principles of action and that his soul lacks unity and harmony even more than (...) the soul of the uncontrolled agent. (shrink)

Fr. Tomasz Czernik Charles Taylor’s Concept of Self-identitySelf-identity, according to Charles Taylor, comes from the community, especially through intersubjective communication. Self-awareness develops from contact with other people. The subject enters this way a moral dimension and public space. On this basis, he can talk about himself because he can describe himself in a social context. The self-identity is represented and conditioned over time. Its stability is rooted in social cohesion, which is based on culture. In the absence of such consistency, (...) there is a modernist and romantic tendency in society. Keywords: Self-identity, Charles Taylor, society, community. (shrink)

W artykule omówiono kontakty dwóch znaczących osobistości w Polsce przełomu XVI i XVII wieku – wojewody Mikołaja Zebrzydowskiego i jezuity ks. Piotra Skargi. Pierwsze ich spotkanie nastąpiło, gdy Zebrzydowski rozpoczynał swoją publiczną działalność, a ksiądz Skarga był już doświadczonym kapłanem i jezuitą. Zebrzydowski nosił się wówczas z zamiarem fundacji kolegium jezuickiego w rodowych dobrach w pobliżu Lublina. Kolejna znacząca współpraca związana była z powołanym do istnienia w Krakowie przez ks. Skargę Bractwem Miłosierdzia. Ksiądz Skarga bardzo pozytywnie oceniał postawę i zaangażowanie (...) Zebrzydowskiego w obydwa dzieła. Sytuacja uległa dość znaczącej zmianie, gdy Zebrzydowski, obrażony na Króla Zygmunta III Wazę, przeszedł do opozycji antykrólewskiej i stanął na czele rokoszu. Ksiądz Skarga dwukrotnie udał się do wojewody, aby odwieść go od tego nielegalnego działania. Poselstwa nie przyniosły pozytywnego rezultatu. Wzajemnie relacje obu osobistości uległy oziębieniu, choć można przypuszczać, że Zebrzydowski pod ich wpływem w końcu pogodził się z królem. Pewne relacje z jezuitami dalej podtrzymywał, ale już bez poprzedniego zaangażowania. (shrink)

The paper defends three claims about Aristotle’s theory of uncontrolled actions (akrasia) in NE 7.3. First, I argue that the first part of NE 7.3 contains the description of the overall state of mind of the agent while she acts without control. Aristotle’s solution to the problem of uncontrolled action lies in the analogy between the uncontrolled agent and people who are drunk, mad, or asleep. This analogy is interpreted as meaning that the uncontrolled agent, while acting without control, is (...) still in possession of her knowledge but she is unable to use it as knowledge due to the temporary disablement of her reason by appetite. Due to this disablement, the uncontrolled agent is temporarily unable to be motivated to act by her knowledge and acts merely on her appetite. Second, I argue that the second part of NE 7.3 provides an analysis of the particular mental state from which the uncontrolled action issues. Its central passage is a description of the uncontrolled agent’s state of mind before the uncontrolled action and not, as it has been traditionally understood, a description of her state of mind during the uncontrolled action. Third, I argue that, on Aristotle’s view, the transition from the state before the uncontrolled action to the state in which the agent already acts without control does not involve any psychological state that would constitute the agent’s choice to abandon her decision and give in to her desires but proceeds on a purely physiological level. (shrink)

I defend two main theses. First, I argue that Aristotle’s account of voluntary action focuses on the conditions under which one is the cause of one’s actions in virtue of being (qua) the individual one is. Aristotle contrasts voluntary action not only with involuntary action but also with cases in which one acts (or does something) due to one’s nature (for example, in virtue of being a member of a certain species) rather than due to one’s own desires (i.e. qua (...) individual). An action can be attributed to one qua individual in two distinct ways depending on whether one is a rational or a non-rational animal. One is responsible for one’s action in both cases, but only in the former case is one also responsible for being the sort of individual that performs it. Aristotle also distinguishes two ways in which an action can be compelled while still being an action of the agent. In the first case, one is compelled by (physically) external forces or circumstances to act against one’s internal impulse. In the second case, one is compelled to act on (internal) impulses that are fixed by one’s nature against one’s own individual impulse. This latter kind of compelled action is only possible in the case of rational agents. Secondly, I argue that Aristotle’s conception of what it is to be a cause of an action inevitably brings in certain normative features which support evaluative judgments and the practice of praise and blame. On Aristotle’s view, any goal-directed behavior that is properly attributable to an individual is (normally) subject to standards that pertain to behavior of that sort. At the most basic level, these standards establish what counts as a successful realization of the goal that one aims at. Thus even in the case of non-rational animals (or children), one can judge the success of what they are doing and encourage (or discourage) similar behavior by praise or blame. These standards are applicable to one’s conduct simply insofar as one is the controlling origin (or efficient cause) of one’s action qua individual. In the case of rational agents the practice of praise and blame can involve a further normative layer since they can be praised or blamed not only for acting in a certain way so as to encourage or discourage them with a view to the future, but also for being – and having become – individuals of a certain sort. Nevertheless, the applicability of such evaluative judgments and of praise and blame is still warranted by one’s being the controlling origin of one’s actions qua the individual one is (in this case, qua rational individual). (shrink)

Artykuł jest odpowiedzią na krytyczne uwagi zgłaszane pod adresem książki Ukrytość i Wcielenie. Teistyczna odpowiedź na argument Johna L. Schellenberga za nieistnieniem Boga przez Stanisława Judyckiego, Ryszarda Mordarskiego, Marka Peplińskiego i Jana Sochonia. Główny zarzut wobec mojego stanowiska głosi, że jest ono zbyt przychylne wobec argumentu J.L. Schellenberga, który niekoniecznie powinien być wzorem ujęcia problematyki ukrytości. Jednym z przejawów przyjęcia założeń kanadyjskiego autora jest zgoda na tezę o istnieniu niewierzących przy braku oporu.